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Glenn Jacobs
[Photo slugged Villa (‘Take Back the Power’) goes opposite the first 
page of this article.]
Take Back the Power
Latino men passing the time in 1974 on Pembroke Street, part of the site where the 
Villa Victoria (Victory Village) housing complex was later developed by the Emer-
gency Tenants Council Inc. The legend on the mural says of the patron, or boss, at 
right, “and he makes himself rich with our work.” Inquilinos Boricuas en Acción 
(Puerto Rican Tenants in Action), commonly known as IBA, provides services to 
3,000 residents to ensure community control is maintained. The construction of 
Villa Victoria is considered a landmark event in the empowerment of Latinos in 
Boston. © 1974 by Carlota Duarte. Reprinted by permission.
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They added a new level, the deputy directors. Now it is like 
there are more people up and less people down. It was like a 
real pyramid and now it’s kind of backwards….The upper part 
has grown and this [pointing to the lower part on the organi-
zation chart] has shrunk. The difference that I see is that now 
I don’t have time to meet with the executive director anymore.
 —Flora Vasquez, Program Director, Centro 
Latino (Interview, June 10, 2009)
Any time we’re in doubt on an issue, I tell my organizers, “Go 
to the street, ask the community. Why are we sitting around a 
table saying, ‘We need to do this, we need to do that’? Have we 
checked out the community?”
 —Gladys Vega, Executive Director of the Chelsea 
Collaborative (Interview, July 28, 2009)
Anyone walking down Chelsea’s main drag, Broadway, would be 
struck by its raucous cacophony of sights and sounds, a panoply of foreign 
languages spoken by women (many mothers with young children and in-
fants), children, teenagers, and men of a variety of physiognomies and 
skin tones; a collage of small specialty shops selling jewelry, clothing, reli-
gious statues, CDs, and mobile phones; and restaurants and eateries serv-
ing El Salvadoran, Vietnamese, Mexican, and Chinese food; pawnshops, 
check-cashing places, bakeries, and coffee shops, with occasional rect-
angles of negative visual space occupied by the post office and chain drug 
and convenience stores. It is a new twist on Mondrian’s polychromatic 
painting Broadway Boogie Woogie, vibrating with the sounds of reggaeton, 
norteño, salsa, or punta instead of jazz. For almost two decades, I have 
been fascinated by this tiny city, which, due to its compactness, induces 
its highly heterogeneous population, perennially fed by an inflow of poor 
immigrants, to rub shoulders socially and civically. This has produced a 
remarkable kind of working-class cosmopolitanism that has, for example, 
occasionally been noticed elsewhere and described in social scientific writ-
ing on multiethnic neighborhoods in early–twentieth-century Los Ange-
les and in late- twentieth-century New York (Wild, 2005; Sanjeck, 1998). 
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My earlier work on Chelsea is a link to the present. There, I closely 
examined the Latino community’s struggle with Boston University over 
the privatization of its schools from 1989 to 1995 and its participation in 
the formation and enactment of educational policy, resulting in the elec-
tion of the first Latina/o to public office (see Jacobs, 1993; Jacobs, 1994; 
Jacobs, 2002). The study demonstrated how intertwined the realities of so-
cial and political citizenship could be. The newly exercised social citizen-
ship achieved by Chelsea’s Latinos provided a basis of legitimacy for the 
struggles of a continuing stream of immigrants facing the successors to 
the oppressive forces their forebears grappled with. In 2002, I mused that 
“one might speculate on how Chelsea’s Latino leadership will evolve and 
which stimuli will shape its development,” and concluded that for Latino 
political representation to keep in step with its own increasing diversity 
and the immigration of other national groups, cosmopolitan organiza-
tional building would need to occur in order to secure educational and 
other gains ( Jacobs, 2002, pp. 44–45). That, indeed, has occurred. 
Chelsea’s overall population and its Latino contingent have grown, 
and Latinos continue to serve in public office and are employed in lo-
cal municipal jobs. Chelsea’s Latino organizations, now steered by those 
schooled in the earlier struggle, have indeed matured and diversified. The 
two foremost Latino community-based organizations (CBOs), Centro La-
tino and the Chelsea Collaborative, both created in 1988, are the focus of 
the research reported on here. Both have impressively developed and un-
dergone organizational transformation, with annual budgets surpassing 
one million dollars. Centro Latino, a leading provider of education (ESL, 
computer), health (HIV testing, case management, support), and com-
munity services (after-school youth, immigration), has just completed a 
merger with an established and reputed Cambridge organization, Con-
cilio Hispano, with a similar service roster. The Collaborative is a leading 
activist organization comprising seven programs: immigrant and immi-
grant worker rights, housing rights, the Somali Bantu Shambaro Commu-
nity, environmental justice, summer youth employment, popular educa-
tion, and educational rights. 
The following analysis utilizes a portion of a total of 30 semistruc-
tured interviews of administrators, staff, and members, or fifteen in each, 
to compare the two leading CBOs with respect to their organizational 
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structures, administrations, and their styles and methods of immigrant 
social and political incorporation. I accomplish this by using my inter-
view data as it bears on two different key features and events in each 
organization. For Centro Latino I first examine a watershed event that 
occurred in 2004 and resulted in an important change in its service ros-
ter and in its total organization structure. Then I examine the way that 
a work ethic, reflecting this change, has surfaced in its key educational 
programs. In the case of the Collaborative, I focus on the way boundar-
ies are drawn and maintained in an organization in which the multiva-
lent roles of member, employee, and citizen run the risk of running into 
conflict, possibly jeopardizing the organization yet creating intimacy and 
organizational solidarity. Following this, I take a close look at how in one 
case the membership in the Collaborative of a community organizer liv-
ing outside Chelsea and representing an activist organization in Roxbury 
has affected the respective mission enactments of both organizations. 
Methods
The data reported here comprise semistructured interviews ranging 
from one hour to an hour and a half in length each. I employed a digital 
voice recorder, with detailed notes taken during the interviews. I also have 
kept a field diary containing memoirs of the interviews and observations 
of the subjects and events transpiring during periods spent in Chelsea. My 
field notes include memos comprising thoughts, ideas, and theoretical 
speculations as they have occurred to me. With the exceptions of the two 
CBOs’ executive directors and Centro’s director of organizational develop-
ment, pseudonyms are used throughout.  
Centro’s Trial by Fire 
 The following close-up look at a point in Centro’s history details a 
decision in 2004 that might have resulted in disaster and ruin but turned 
out to be a salubrious one, leaving the organization stronger. It comprises 
the ingredients of a fateful decision of Centro executives to sacrifice a 
program that delivered one-fourth of the agency’s funding and to change 
the organizational profile and program roster into a more effective and 
streamlined one. Here the agency’s story is that of its navigation through 
the shoals of inadequate funds, the culling of programs, and the risks of 
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organizational development and transformation. This streamlining, re-
sulting in a layered organizational structure, while effective, was debat-
ably one that also created an administrative stratum some think actu-
ally did not produce efficiency but buffers and inhibits communication 
between the executive and lower-level personnel. This account of events 
and issues surrounding that fateful climax was given to the author by 
Centro executives Juan Vega and Monique Puig-Antich in a joint inter-
view on December 4, 2008. Quoted material from that interview will be 
attributed to them by name. 
Centro’s planning and creation in 1988 occurred at the hands of local 
foundations and progressive state representatives and planners who had 
initially produced a feasibility study resulting in a five-year plan for the 
development of four other Latino community-based agencies in Chelsea, 
including the Collaborative. Centro Latino (originally called Centro His-
pano, a name kept for seven years) was incorporated in 1989. During its 
first year, it “began in a back room of the Chelsea Human Services Col-
laborative [now the Chelsea Collaborative], and then moved to an office 
suite” ( Juan Vega). 
In 1998, when Juan Vega came on board, the agency had been run-
ning deficits for several years. A new finance director and deputy director 
of programs were needed, and programs needed to be eliminated. By the 
time of Juan Vega’s arrival, things seemed chaotic. As he put it, “People 
were passing through. You could feel the impact of foundations ready to 
fund [but] the agency was spread very thin,” meaning that Centro had 
accumulated “a lot of tiny little programs: domestic violence, family emer-
gency assistance, etc.” Many would eventually be jettisoned because of the 
excessive effort and too little funding to maintain them. ( Juan Vega). As 
a result, in 1999–2000 “the dominoes started to topple and people began 
to leave: it was just about changing the culture of the organization. We 
hadn’t yet thinned out our priorities; it was just about reinventing and 
professionalizing services….” ( Juan Vega) Changing the culture meant, for 
example, that as Vega put it, you didn’t have to be poor to have integrity 
in serving the community. Something had to be done both to stabilize 
the agency and to make it economically more viable. The agency had to 
become more financially viable. Thus, “2002–2003 was a time of transi-
tion, and of weeding out, streamlining and assessment. What does the 
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community need and what do we do best? [We had to] to tell staff and 
clients that we can’t do certain programs anymore,” largely due to chroni-
cally inadequate funding. (Monique Puig-Antich) 
The deputy program director, chief financial officer, and Vega con-
ferred and the shock came when it was decided to sacrifice a big De-
partment of Public Health contract—AIDS Prevention Education—that 
brought in $250,000 a year “that dictated what we did every year, and 
whatever else we did we had to consider its impact on this program….The 
big one was the one that had to go.” ( Juan Vega) “It had a lot of staff and a 
separate site across the street….It paid for everything; it was one quarter 
of the agency’s revenue (we were at the one million dollar mark). It was 
the time Bush was coming in and we knew that the tide against it was 
coming in, a la abstinence.” (Monique Puig-Antich) “We gave three to four 
months advance notice. DPH was in disbelief because it was unheard of, 
but it was the agency’s saving grace.” ( Juan Vega) 
Things were bound to get worse before they got better. “We ran out 
of cash. We hit the brick wall and couldn’t make payroll.” ( Juan Vega) In 
March 2004, Juan and the chief financial officer looked down the road and 
saw the agency was heading toward a $100,000 deficit. Something had 
to be done. They had gambled and, without some kind of bailout, stood 
to have the agency scuttled. They went to their local foundation funders 
with a plan for turning the agency around, and with $25,000 in pledges 
from local businesspeople, laid their cards on the table: It was a choice of 
either amputating the state-funded program or hemorrhaging out of exis-
tence. “We developed a plan, a test of our thinking on how we would turn 
the agency around, where we saw the funding gap, the downfall, detailed 
financials, and when we expected the worst part to come. We laid it out 
in front.” ( Juan Vega) The foundations came through. “Centro developed a 
media campaign, El Mundo had articles, Univision responded, there was 
a poverty march dedicated to Centro. We asked all the staff to take a pay 
reduction and closed the agency on Fridays, and the staff cooperated and 
went a week without pay and the majority stayed put. For three months 
we instituted a four day work week.” ( Juan Vega) 
In a focus group I conducted with four representatives of some of 
Centro’s foundation funders, two of whom reminisced about that episode, 
I was told that at that juncture the local funding foundations, some of 
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whom created Centro, took a close look at the agency and its chief ex-
ecutive officer in order to decide upon the soundness of leadership and 
the agency’s economic and administrative viability. As one said, the cir-
cumstances “required a full-fledged review. Where is Centro situated as a 
community-based organization? It’s an anchor organization, and what I 
got was that Juan was solid and forthright [by] leveling with us. We met 
with some of his board members and got a snapshot of their level of con-
fidence—that they were going to stick with it.” Another remarked, “We 
were in constant contact with them and they had support from the com-
munity. They were in serious trouble and they stuck with what they were 
trying to do.” (Focus group interview, December 10, 2008) In referring to 
it as an anchor organization, the foundations were alluding to Centro’s 
foothold in the community and the stability it contributed to the non-
profit service provider’s role in giving stable support to the city’s needy 
population. The funders clearly were confident that this decision, while 
risky, was not irresponsible or rash.
As part of the plan, Monique Antich-Puig came on that year as the 
director of organizational development, a job she said she had little actual 
experience with (she has a master’s in educational policy and originally 
taught English as a Second Language), but which she learned by doing: 
“I had no development experience at all. I had some early successes that 
kept me here. I started by writing some grants that came in a couple of 
months. A few of the first ones I sent out came in with checks.” Both she 
and the organization had survived and proven themselves in trials by fire. 
Next she tried her hand at planning a “gala” fundraiser that raised $50,000 
and became an annual event that most recently more than doubled the 
initial figure. More than a fundraiser, she was hired as a planner who could 
visualize the larger picture in terms of understanding and evaluating the 
agency’s internal structure, its complement of programs, and its position 
and role in the community as a service provider.
At present, along with its chief financial officer and director of or-
ganizational development, two operations directors have been added, 
constituting an administrative layer beneath the executive director—the 
deputy directors—with a bevy of program directors beneath them. Thus 
it is developing an organizational line or administrative hierarchy. While 
this appears to enhance organizational efficiency, it also is an embryonic 
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bureaucracy, with buffers between an administrative pinnacle, and ser-
vice providers and clients, creating insularity and the potential for prob-
lems of communication between frontline staff and administrators, and 
the executive. As described in the epigraph, the new added level of admin-
istration has buffered relationships and communication with the execu-
tive director. Flora Vasquez told me,
The change that I see lately…is that before the executive direc-
tor used to be a little bit more involved in the development of 
the programs and used to be more aware of what was hap-
pening with each and every program….He decided to add a new 
level of administration (Flora Vasquez, Interview, June 10, 2009).
She says that the absence of that communication has resulted in her 
feeling like she’s at sea when it comes to getting feedback and direction: 
“I don’t feel that I get enough supervision, to tell you the truth, or enough 
support.” Thus, with the absence of supervision and support there is a 
resulting anomie, punctuated by the necessity to quell crises stemming 
from the lack of communication and contact between levels:
I feel that even though I am a program director I’m kind of 
hanging by myself….I don’t know if it’s that ____ [her super-
visor] has more people to supervise or that his attention is 
somewhere else. I feel that my program stays…and it goes be-
cause I think that they have confidence in me, that they trust 
me and everything but I’m not connected to nobody....I love 
Centro as an agency but sometimes I wonder. People tend to 
act only when there are fires. They like to put fires out but they 
don’t like to be involved much in anything.
An individual teaching ESL classes had an interesting and candid 
take on the organization members’ understanding of its clients that 
speaks to the administrative, ethnic, and status forms of social distance 
between Centro’s administrators and clients: “We sometimes think we 
know our clients better than we do.…[W]e don’t always necessarily have 
a clear idea of the needs of our clients or the needs of Chelsea. We think 
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we do, but we don’t know for sure.” When I remarked that a lot of Centro’s 
staff and its administrative leadership, including Juan Vega, is Latino, and 
asked if this went for them and him as well, she replied, “I think yes, if 
somebody comes in and is going to do what he has done for himself, it 
is very different than some of our clientele….Latinos as a whole are not 
pigeon-holed as one particular group. There’s [sic] a lot of people from dif-
ferent countries.” When I raised Juan Vega being Puerto Rican, and thus 
a part of the old Latino mainstay of the city, and that not all Latinos in 
Chelsea are the same, she immediately added, “versus undocumented 
El Salvadorans who have come from nothing, who have never been to 
school. Our clientele at times are a little bit different….We have a lot of 
El Salvadorans, a lot of undocumented learners here who don’t have the 
resources and the status.” (Linda Ridgeway, Interview, June 30, 2009) She 
added that “the people at the top are not a closed door,” albeit the admin-
istration has to think about the bottom line and that, nonetheless, many 
things are happening to bridge the social gaps in the population. 
In addition, speaking about Centro’s program roster, this staff mem-
ber insightfully remarked that “another interesting thing about our clien-
tele in terms of job placement is, that most clients will come and say, ‘I’m 
taking English to get a better job,’ but they don’t necessarily want some-
one to tell them what that job is. They have in their head already what 
they want to do.” She noted that Centro has gotten out of the business 
of workforce placement, observing that much government employment 
placement money is earmarked for types of jobs their clients may not 
want to do, so offering that service would be disrespectful of their clients’ 
own career aims. Thus, “they may be a busboy but they want to be a line 
order chef….Our learners don’t necessarily think there’s anything wrong 
with their job.” In this respect, by not lapsing into the official ethnocentric 
lexicon of workforce development the agency remains in tune with its 
clientele.
With a recent merger with an organization of comparable size, the 
tendency toward bureaucratization and communicative buffering is like-
ly to intensify, for as Juan Vega said in response to my question concerning 
the danger of Centro becoming too businesslike, “Our danger is that we 
won’t become businesslike enough!” (December 4, 2008)
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 Professionalism and the Work Ethic
Along with a businesslike structure comes a work ethic that fits well 
with it. While this is not explicitly stated as part of the organizational mis-
sion, it revealed itself in interviews with several staff, and certainly serves 
as a component of what might be called an ethic of immigrant incorpo-
ration—that is, a kind of acculturative mechanism, shaping relationships 
with Centro’s clients and thereby assisting them to adapt to the new social 
world many have entered. For the employees, key aspects of the work ethic 
aid them in interpreting clients’ attitudes as they respond to an unfamiliar 
and occasionally disagreeable reception encountered in the classroom and 
the world outside. The work ethic is a cultural complex of ideas and values 
stressing the worth of pursuing a career, deferring gratification of present 
desires, and investing sustained effort to do so. It is nothing less than the 
secularized variant of the Protestant Ethic described by Max Weber more 
than a century ago. (Weber, 1958)
In an interview with Julio Flores, a supervisor, he emphasized how the 
people now working at Centro are more professional due to the standards 
and salary levels established in the watershed period described above: 
When the three of them [the chief financial officer, deputy director of 
programs, and Juan Vega] came here they were the ones who really started 
working hard on the structure, on how people come dressing to work, the 
attitude at the front desk, with the clients, with the students. You know, 
those types of professional services; and with time, you know, to be able to 
get more money to be able to raise [the] salary range, we were able to bring 
more professional people into Centro (Interview, August 26, 2009). 
Clearly, in addition to denoting the skills qualifying one for the job, 
professionalism has an ideological component connoting impression man-
agement (e.g., dress), or one’s composure and attitude toward one’s work. 
Thus, as part and parcel of developing a nascent bureaucracy, the water-
shed period also was responsible for instilling a sensibility in the organiza-
tion. This sensibility’s ideological dimension includes as well a propensity 
for Centro staff both to exhibit and to inculcate attitudes toward work and 
responsibility in their clients and students, for this also meets the quality 
standards of the agents who fund the programs they work in.
In this regard, Julio Flores went on to compliment an HIV testing and 
case-management specialist, Felipe: “You see Felipe is a specialist in what 
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he does. I mean Felipe can get through four hundred HIV tests in a year 
with a 95 percent return rate.” He added that “it doesn’t matter how many 
HIV tests we do. Our contract [with the Department of Public Health] 
requires us to have an 85% return rate.” (Interview, August 26, 2009) More 
to the point, if staff members are evaluated on results, how does Felipe 
achieve such superlative numbers exceeding the evaluation standard of 
the program? It is through his dedication and experience, which enable 
him to motivate clients who come to the agency for testing to return to 
receive test results. But because Felipe is so effective, his workload has 
become so heavy that, according to discussions I have had with him, he 
has been prompted to vigorously support the agency hiring an additional 
tester and case manager, whom he is currently training. By the same to-
ken, he lobbied against his immediate supervisor hiring an acquaintance 
with fewer qualifications, thereby risking some on-the-job dissonance for 
himself. Thus, professionalism can be a double-edged sword.
When it comes to handling clients, several interviewed staff instruc-
tors of ESL and computer courses intimated that, having become accus-
tomed to free educational and other services, a work ethic was wanting 
among their student clients. Others, in discussing their students’ slow 
progress and/or lack of literacy, remarked on their ignorance of U.S. his-
tory and holidays. Some employees remarked on a kind of “freeloading” 
syndrome among their immigrant clients. A technical education supervi-
sor and teacher, Aristide Colon, directly connected the issue of free ser-
vices with his students’ lack of progress, suggesting that the agency may 
be coddling its clients: 
We are trying to get people out of the custom of getting every-
thing for free….I work with clients that are very independent 
but I work with a lot of newcomers in the U.S. that once they 
see all the help they can get—free healthcare, housing, food, 
bilingual services—after a while they don’t want to move on 
or up in level. A lot of clients go to Bunker Hill [Community 
College] after us, and after they get to Bunker Hill they want to 
come back….They can’t but we hear that at the beginning, and 
they may quit Bunker Hill and fail. I sometimes wonder if we 
are babysitting too much our students and clients (Interview, 
July 8, 2009).
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This teacher came from South America to Chelsea as a child and 
participated throughout his teenage years in a number of Centro’s pro-
grams, eventually going on to Bunker Hill Community College and from 
there to complete a college degree in computer science. He likened Centro 
to a family and has returned as a dedicated teacher and program director. 
It is interesting that he sees getting services for free as a “custom,” if not 
carried by clients from their home countries, perhaps one learned here 
as a kind of incorporative disability or syndrome fostered by their experi-
ences with service agencies. In addition, he ironically remarked on the 
facility with which some of his students would enunciate the importance 
of getting their education for free, while driving nice cars and sporting 
fancy cellular phones. Similarly, a supervisor, Silvia Negrón, added that 
it is important to “quite frankly stop the ‘Gimme everything for free atti-
tude,’” noting that “I’ve been accused of sounding like a Republican when 
I say that, but I really believe we need to help people help themselves.” 
(Interview, August 20, 2009) 
Some staff in their narratives connect clients’ experiences with free 
classes with their low levels of literacy, their inability to progress, and their 
deficiency of knowledge of United States history, as is the case in the fol-
lowing interview excerpt from an ESL teacher initially juxtaposing her 
students’ slow progress with Centro’s free classes and their personal prob-
lems, and then their provincialism regarding the world outside of Chelsea 
and their ignorance of U.S. cultural conventions.
When I first came, even though I was familiar with the kind 
of students that would be here, I was still pretty surprised by 
them. [Ques.: “How come?”] I know that many of our students 
have been at Centro for a long time because we have free class-
es and we don’t move people out as quickly due to a lot of per-
sonal factors that the students have which inhibit them from 
studying and improving, but I was a little surprised at their 
level of education and English considering we have a number 
of students who’ve lived in Chelsea the majority of their life. I 
mean Chelsea is great. You don’t have to speak English if you 
don’t want to. You can get any services you need in Spanish, 
but I know that most all my students work outside of Chelsea 
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with other immigrants. I’m talking about literacy and knowl-
edge of the world outside of this community. [Ques.: What sur-
prised you, lack of understanding and knowledge of the out-
side world?] Knowledge of history and events, especially U.S. 
history and events. You know if you have lived here a long time 
we celebrate a lot of holidays and make that pretty known to 
people. (Eva Simmons, Interview, July 6, 2009)
She subsequently added that her pedagogy entailed assisting stu-
dents to connect classroom processes and reading to their lives: “The stu-
dents need to make more of a connection on how this is going to help 
improve their life.” She cited Jim Cummins’s writing on language learning 
and identity (e.g., Cummins, 1994) and sincerely tried to bridge the cul-
tural gaps between her students and her professional expectations. 
In the above narrative witness this instructor’s attempt to recon-
cile the cultural differences between her and her students and her own 
dismay at their lack of familiarity with, and perhaps even interest in, her 
nation’s history and culture. Some teachers have an easier time with this 
than others, as in the case of another ESL instructor who grew up in Chel-
sea and used his own working-class immigrant family background as a 
way to bridge the ethnic difference between him and his students and to 
connect with them. “I should be the last person to tell people they’re not 
welcome.” (Philip David, Interview, July 14, 2009)
The above material evinces the clear dedication of staff to their 
educational mission. On the whole they manifest tremendous empathy 
with their students, and their enunciation of the Protestant Ethic is sym-
pathetically voiced with the aim of enabling their clients and students 
to make it in an increasingly demanding environment of narrowing em-
ployment opportunities that increasingly require specialized training. 
Many remark on how, on the other hand, students do catch on and apply 
themselves, matching their students’ diligence with a dialogic pedagogy, 
prompting them to learn through making connections between the sub-
ject matter and their lives. Seeing Chelsea as a kind of supportive environ-
ment with its relative ease in securing services and with some students’ 
relaxed sense of the necessity to learn English, the staff ’s voicing of the 
work ethic is done good-naturedly in the spirit of helping them. Thus it 
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reflects, in part, the teachers’ own experiences in preparing themselves 
professionally. By the same token, many of the ESL teachers are part-time 
workers piecing together a living with several jobs, thus facing the same 
conditions as their underemployed students. One staff member agreed 
with this analogy and added that this is why she has to come to class well-
prepared, since some students may have taken time off from work to at-
tend and she does to want to waste their time. Likewise, in the fee-based 
programs students want to make progress and get their money’s worth. 
( Jill Hembro, Interview, July 15, 2009) 
The Political Risks 
As suggested by Gladys Vega’s statement in the epigraph, commu-
nity organizing is a principal method of information gathering as well as 
implementing the Collaborative’s action strategy. Growing out of an or-
ganization created in 1988 by the same parties involved in the creation 
of Centro, the Collaborative originally was an association of executive 
directors of direct service-providing agencies (i.e., Chelsea Human Ser-
vices Collaborative). Gladys Vega began work there as a receptionist and 
simultaneously worked in the community to organize Latino leaders to 
develop a voice to enunciate their own needs. As she put it, “White people 
were always making the decisions, and with the existing nonprofits, went 
and gave the community what they thought was needed.” (Gladys Vega, 
Interview, July 28, 2009) In 2006 she became the Collaborative’s execu-
tive director. By using a community organizing method of educating its 
constituents and coupling this method to a direct-action approach to re-
dressing grievances, rectifying injustices, and pressing for social change, 
the Collaborative, in effect, uses social conflict in a constructive manner, 
and does so essentially as a two-layered “horizontal” organization whose 
executives bow to the decisions arrived at by its constituent group mem-
bers and staff through a democratic process of consensus building. 
Social action, even as it creates controversy and strong criticism, 
gets results and enhances its legitimacy among and for groups that pre-
vailing social forces otherwise tend to repress and marginalize. Moreover, 
in redressing grievances and forcing an unscrupulous employer who 
might withhold wages or tips to pay their undocumented employees, in 
indicting travel agents illegally pilfering immigrants’ air ticket deposits, 
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and check-cashing concerns for not recording immigrants’ utility bill de-
posits or delivering paid-for remittances back home, in getting free legal 
assistance and back pay for “lumpers” (workers who off-load trucks at 
a local supermarket chain distribution center), normative precedents 
are set and lessons taught for, and to, the local community (see Chelsea 
Collaborative, undated). On a somewhat larger scale, the Collaborative 
organized local residents, parents, students, and others, using tactics of 
door-to-door recruiting, testifying at public hearings, data gathering via 
participatory action research, demonstrating, and disrupting “several 
high profile demonstrations by the power company” that applied to the 
city and state regulatory agencies to build a 250-megawatt diesel power 
plant in a Chelsea neighborhood but scuttled its planned installment (Mi-
randa, Reynoso and Staples, undated, p. 6). While in all of these examples 
local and outside interests of businesses are thwarted and offended, win-
ning battles of social justice enhances the legitimacy of the groups engag-
ing in them, not to mention reinforcing collective solidarity among those 
who did the fighting. 
When, as in the case of the power plant, larger extra-community 
forces are thwarted, the publicity accompanying the struggle is used to 
solidify the sentiments of the rest of the city with those neighborhood 
residents on whose behalf the struggle has been waged, thus enfolding 
those who struggled in the city’s social as well as its geographic boundar-
ies. This is how incorporation at base encompasses a social phenomenon. 
Having said this, however, it should be noted that its methods, or mode of 
being in the community, impel the Collaborative’s membership and staff to 
meticulously exercise discretion in the conduct of their and the organiza-
tion’s business.
Since it is a nonprofit corporation, a “501C3,” it is legally obliged not 
to engage in partisan politics. Thus, members who are individually run-
ning for or occupying public office must not engage in political activities 
during work time or on the premises of the Collaborative’s office, or dur-
ing the conduct of its activities and programs. In a recent interview, Elise 
Antonelli, a two-thirds-time employee and ex–city official, discussed how 
intertwined employment and membership is, and can become with the 
different sides of a person’s life thereby integrating it: 
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You cannot walk around Chelsea without them mentioning 
[names three members]....You become a member, you become 
part of a coalition and things like that, whether it’s the tenant’s 
association, whether it’s CUDE the parent’s group, whether 
it’s Green Space, whether it’s the Latino Immigrant Commit-
tee, you know, you just become involved and you want to help. 
You become part of a committee, and then if you have kids 
you might have an issue with the school and you might talk to 
someone and become part of the parent groups, or if you have 
a kid that’s the age of fourteen they’ll apply for the Summer 
Youth Employment Program. It’s all entwined….It becomes al-
most like a family (Interview, August 25, 2009).
Employment at, and membership in, the Collaborative can be-
come risky if one’s outside life includes holding political office or being 
involved in partisan activity. In our discussion Elise Antonelli mentioned 
five names of Collaborative board members who are now or recently have 
been City Council members. As a result, employees, members, and the 
Collaborative occasionally walk a thin line in terms of their interests and 
roles, as Elise Antonelli suggests, using herself as an example. “I work here 
from eight to three. I work for the Collaborative, I get paid by the Col-
laborative, but from 3:30 to whatever is my time. If I want to go and hold 
signs for ____ , I can do that, but people don’t see that.” Thus, in referring 
to a member who is on the City Council:
It’s very tricky….I think it gets more tricky for _____ [an em-
ployee], because even though she’s on the City Council she still 
fights for her environmental justice issues, and that’s one hat 
that she wears. You have to be very careful because you don’t 
want people to come out and to point fingers saying, “Oh, it’s 
’cause she works for the Collaborative, and things have come 
out that hurt us.”
She says, “and that’s where we all have to be very careful. On Election 
Day, we should all take it off. That’s our personal time.” Here one’s simul-
taneous outside political involvement and Collaborative employment can 
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be seen by both the public and the law as a conflict of interest because 
the Collaborative is a nonprofit, and even more significantly, as Antonelli 
states, because of public opinion, which in the compactness and density 
of Chelsea often courses through interpersonal contacts and relations. 
Moreover, the risk of negative public opinion is a double-edged sword be-
cause it can alienate politicians connected with state funding agencies. 
As she puts it:
We have to be very careful with our funders, especially when 
one of our projects is getting the vote out, the Voter Initiative, 
you know, registering people. [Interviewer: “Things have come 
out that, do what, get you in trouble with funders?”] Get us in 
trouble with funders in the sense that…the negative press. A 
politician doesn’t want, you know, to fund a group that, you 
know, people are against them.
The Collaborative’s activities here get very dicey, especially the Voter 
Initiative, as Antonelli suggests, because the organization is funded to en-
gage the political process, not only in registering voters but in informing 
voters of their rights, which is, as she puts it, “part of educating people, 
you know showing them, ‘These are your rights.’ If there’s an issue at the 
poll, ‘These are your rights. They should not turn you away.’ I’m telling you, 
people have learned to speak up and say, ‘No, I know I can vote here.’…
Some of the poll workers can be nasty!” Such are the risks of challenging 
prejudices and threatening interests.
Finally, the only drawback to the Collaborative’s organizational for-
mat stems from the very features that comprise its virtues: its lack of an 
authority-laden hierarchy and the relative autonomy of its members, staff, 
and groups that result in actions taken that are sometimes not clearly 
communicated to everyone. While this was not a strong complaint 
among those I interviewed, some have noted it in passing, mentioning 
it in conjunction with the need for more advanced program planning, or 
have simply remarked that they were not informed in this or that case 
about paperwork that had been completed. On the other hand, many 
people that I interviewed proudly stated that a key admirable feature 
of the Collaborative is its capacity to act immediately on an issue when 
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needed. Thus Alex Soto, whose work with the Collaborative I describe 
below, noted that after a 2007 raid by the Immigration and Customs En-
forcement in New Bedford, Massachusetts, resulting in the flash deporta-
tion of a large number of Maya K’iche undocumented workers, leaving 
many of their children deserted, the Collaborative responded with aid im-
mediately and in two days came up with an emergency plan for dealing 
with such an eventuality in Chelsea. Perhaps piecemeal communication 
is a small price to pay for the capacity to respond in a spontaneous and 
effective manner.
 A Case of Cross-Community Collaboration
While the closeness of the Collaborative members’ and member-
employee relationships can be risky for funding and public opinion, the 
other side of this issue is its evident virtue, given that the closeness of 
the Collaborative staff and membership to the community is definitely 
a product of the way it engages the community and the manner it un-
derstands its mission as a community-building one. There is little doubt 
that the integrality of Latino and other immigrants to its mission of social 
justice speaks to its effectiveness as a social incorporator of immigrants. 
After all, isn’t enabling immigrants to resist exploitation and thereby gain 
materially tantamount to rendering a service that enhances participa-
tion or incorporation in society? Moreover, the solidarity fostered by the 
Collaborative’s modus operandi is an asset and is not based on excluding 
others. In the case that follows, we learn about partnering between the 
Collaborative and an organization in Boston. It is an object lesson in how 
partnering stems from the Collaborative’s modus operandi.
Alex Soto is a community organizer for a Boston-based environmen-
tal justice organization, Alternatives for Community Development (ACE), 
and a group within it, the T Riders, created in 1999, that focuses on pub-
lic transportation equity in the city and surrounding area. The group was 
started by ACE to deal with the high asthma rates in Roxbury, a predom-
inantly African American community. ACE mapped the hazards in the 
area, consisting of much truck traffic, an MBTA bus terminal and garage 
(the Bartley yard) that kept 100 buses constantly running, a trash-transfer 
site for a company routing refuse to other parts of the state, the Boston 
Public Schools garage, and a private bus depot. The group started the 
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Clean Buses for Boston campaign, targeting the MBTA, and soon learned 
at community meetings that, in addition to the environmental hazards, 
the public transportation service in the area was poor. The completion 
of the Big Dig made clear it directly benefited only motorists, and the 
Conservation Law Foundation sued to compel the state to provide better 
public transport. This action succeeded in getting the state to fund several 
urban bus lines and a subway extension, and make several commitments 
to new MBTA projects.
In 2000 and 2003, transit fares were increased. “During this time 
somebody in the Chelsea Collaborative…heard about the T Riders union, 
and he came to one of the meetings and he said, ‘Listen, you know, like 
we live in Chelsea, we’re facing the same problems that you guys are fac-
ing here in Roxbury: buses are late and dirty, weekend service is really 
poor, we can’t get where we want to go on weekdays. We want to cre-
ate a committee over there.’ So ACE decided to provide the resources to 
help this group to address some of the issues that Chelsea was facing at 
that time.” (Alex Soto, Interview, July 23, 2009) Through the Collaborative’s 
Green Space program ACE was able to link the environmental justice 
issue and Chelsea’s transportation issues. In 2005 or 2006 Soto came to 
Chelsea, when the program was already established, and met members 
of the Collaborative: “I came on board to supply support for what [the 
leader-organizer] was trying to do with transit justice in the area.” ACE 
also supplied legal support for the aforementioned campaign against the 
power plant in Chelsea. 
As an outsider, Soto sees the Collaborative as “one of the organiza-
tions that’s truly open to the community. We have many nonprofit organi-
zations in the area—Chelsea, East Boston—and [in contrast to] the usual 
9 to 5 open business hours, the Collaborative is trying to go beyond that. 
It’s more a human face….That for me is something very positive I would 
like to see in other organizations.” He related that the previous evening 
ACE had a once-a-year Game Night in the Collaborative’s offices for the 
T Riders Union members. “We were playing karaoke with the members, 
you know dominoes, all of those kinds of things, and the organization was 
comfortable enough to give us the key, and say to us, ‘Hey guys make sure 
everything is closed.’ I don’t know, I do not know any other organization 
that is comfortable to do that, like for anyone that is not part of the staff.” 
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(Alex Soto, Interview, July 23, 2009) He went on to say that he and other 
ACE members participate in the Collaborative’s activities, such as dem-
onstrations in front of the aforementioned check-cashing establishment, 
its march to observe International Workers’ Day on May 1, and the Chel-
sea River Revel, an annual event organized by the Collaborative’s Green 
Space committee on the bridge connecting Chelsea and East Boston. 
What is unique is the trust each organization has extended to the 
other, which has led to almost an immediate sharing of resources. This 
trust appears to be based on the felt common experiences of both mem-
berships. Also what is interesting is the cross-ethnic and -racial nature of 
their cooperation. Alex Soto characterized the potential relations of the 
two organizations’ African American and Latino constituencies:
Here in Roxbury and Dorchester I can say pretty much that 
ninety percent are African American. One of the reasons 
I think ACE decides to bring a Latino [i.e., himself ] into the 
staff…was with the idea to create this connection….I think me 
being the person that is in contact with Chelsea… usually ev-
ery time we have a meeting over there I try to bring somebody 
from Roxbury or Dorchester that is African American….[Re-
garding] this perception that “we’re so different, you know like, 
that you guys have your own way to address issues…and we 
have our own way,”…at the end of the day, you know, there is 
so much similarity in these two communities that sometimes 
the society…tries to divide the communities. (Interview, Alex 
Soto, July 23, 2009)
Alex’s statement underscores the possible motives for ACE having 
hired him, a Latino, to organize black people around transportation is-
sues, and then demonstrates the advantage for having done so as repre-
sented by the potency of the cross-racial and -ethnic coalition he helped 
create in order to overcome the fictions used to divide Latinos and blacks. 
In a sense, the proof of coalescing is in the pudding, for the two organiza-
tions took to each other on the basis of common need and immediately 
pooled their resources.
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Betwixt and Between Service and Advocacy
While common sense dichotomizes service and activism/advoca-
cy, the literature on immigrant-based nonprofits indicates that the line 
between them cannot be definitively drawn and that some community-
based organizations do both. So, while Centro does seem to fit the mold 
of an exclusively service-offering nonprofit, and the activist Collabora-
tive engages in strategies of community change, we learn that the for-
mer engages in some advocacy and the latter also provides services. In 
this regard, Els de Graauw, a political scientist at City University of New 
York, Baruch College, in summarizing some of her findings on forty-five 
nonprofits catering to immigrants in San Francisco, corrects mistaken 
conceptions rigidly dichotomizing service and advocacy in such organi-
zations:
It would be a mistake to characterize them solely as service 
providers. They are increasingly combining service provision 
with advocacy campaigns and political activism….With their 
service provision activities, nonprofits fight the symptoms of 
a limited public service system. With their advocacy activities, 
they fight the root causes of the injustices immigrants experi-
ence in American society. (2008, pp. 326, 328)
We can bypass the simplistic service-advocacy dichotomy if we 
frame the issue in terms of the quid pro quos exchanged between the or-
ganizations and their clients and members. Some literature on immigrant 
nonprofits focuses on the extent and kind of “reciprocity” that the orga-
nization expects, demands, or persuades clients and members to return. 
In other words, the organization “communicates to the local resident that 
some form of return [such as participation in events] to the organization 
is expected from him or her” in exchange for services rendered. (Marwell, 
2004, p. 272; de Graauw, p. 330) With respect to the connection between 
reciprocity and incorporation, Columbia University sociologist Nicole P. 
Marwell tells us that sociopolitical participation consists of community-
building and organizational strengthening:
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When CBOs engage in reciprocal service provision…they 
move from only providing services to also doing community 
building work. In this transition there is a qualitative shift in 
the relationships between CBOs and their clients. CBOs that 
do community building create stronger relationships with 
their clients, thereby maintaining client identification with 
the CBOs, their community programmatic missions, and their 
staffs. (2004, p. 275)
In the case of the community-organizing Collaborative, such reci-
procity actually is its mainstay, although it is not regarded as service re-
turned to the organization but as participation in programs of commu-
nity change and betterment. Moreover, Gladys Vega’s exhortation to go 
to the street is an organizing principle used to gather information about 
the immigrant communities’ needs, concerns, and problems that is di-
rectly fed into the Collaborative’s ever-changing recruitment and action 
agendas and strategies to transform the circumstances of immigrants in 
Chelsea, and thereby socially incorporate them. In other words, after re-
ceiving help, the Collaborative’s clients often are recruited into participat-
ing in programs targeting social change. While Centro does not require 
reciprocity from its clients but does do so from its employees, I have heard 
statements rhetorically exhorting clients to exercise more responsibility 
to and for the community, as when a supervisor plaintively told me, “We 
need to do a better job of taking people from where they are and helping, 
pushing them to take more responsibility for the community.” (Silvia Ne-
grón, Interview, August 20, 2009) In addition, while Centro does not have 
a formal requirement, it does expect a modicum of employee participation 
in off-hours advocacy and job-connected activities. 
Because Centro offers fee-driven as well as free services, expecta-
tions for client reciprocity are likely to remain somewhat muted, with 
moral suasion instead exercised on clients, and is channeled pedagogi-
cally into the educational and quasi-educational context of its programs. 
On the other hand, for employees, as one supervisor, Julio Flores, put it, 
“We encourage staff, clients, and students to attend lobbying days. There’s 
Cinco de Mayo, [and] lobbying days at the State House for immigration 
reform. We go to those.” ( Julio Flores, Interview, August 26, 2009) More-
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over, this interviewee, underscoring the expectations and formal means 
of compensation for employees’ participation in extracurricular events, 
informed me: 
When people are hired we talk about these activities, and at 
staff meetings. Everyone does participate. If someone says, 
“That’s not part of my job description,” you can do that but 
you’ll know it’s not right to do that. If you talk to your imme-
diate supervisor, we have a comp time policy. We have many 
activities on a Saturday or Sunday and you get paid for that. 
( Julio Flores, Interview, August 26, 2009)  
When I questioned him about whether some of these activities were 
actually work-related tasks, such as handing out flyers advertising Centro 
services, I was told they were. Thus, in the minds of some Centro em-
ployees, outside advocacy and work-related participation seem to form 
a seamless web. It is clear that reciprocity as I have defined it here, as the 
obligation to repay service (or paid work) with voluntary service to the 
organization, applies almost exclusively to Centro’s employees and not to 
its clients.
So what is to be concluded about the two organizations’ roles in 
incorporating immigrants—that is, facilitating their social, economic, 
and political participation, in Chelsea? Centro accomplishes immigrant 
incorporation through fee-driven or free services provided by an increas-
ingly professional staff. The clear division between Centro’s staff, and its 
students and clients, versus the fluid, murky, and occasionally risky blur-
ring and overlap of the boundaries between the horizontally organized 
Collaborative staff, members, and civilians, and between itself and the 
surrounding community, reflects on the very different organizational 
structures and how these two organizations incorporate immigrants into 
the surrounding society. The more vertical, verging on bureaucratic, orga-
nizational structure of Centro developed out of a calculated attempt to 
make itself financially more viable and more professional (i.e., to enhance 
the specialized qualifications of its personnel). In accomplishing this aim, 
Centro in a sense pays the piper because it risks alienating its employees 
and developing anomie, or a sense of a loss of purpose among them. 
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The Collaborative accomplishes incorporation through its method 
of community organizing, which, although providing services to would-
be and actual members, does so for the purpose of recruiting them to 
participate in a widening circle of participation in social change. Thus, 
in Centro’s case, the line dividing incorporator and incorporatee is more 
clearly drawn, whereas for the Collaborative the encompassing aims of 
participation in social action and the blurring or overlap of the roles of 
staff, members, and citizens obviates the distinction and renders these 
participants agents of their own incorporation. In this sense, incorpo-
ration proceeds through utilization of a more horizontal organizational 
format based on a consensual teamwork model fostering individual and 
collective self-reliance. The price paid here, as I have described it, consists 
of the stresses and strains caused by its very virtues—that is, the internal 
stress stemming from the necessity of keeping its organizational and role 
definitional books straight, and externally, in carefully managing its orga-
nizational impressions in the face of local public opinion and the percep-
tions of local and state politicians and funders. 
In sum, what does all of this say about the value of the two organiza-
tions to their immigrant clientele? Both organizations, with the qualifica-
tions noted above, do their jobs well: the nature and extent of services of-
fered by the Collaborative cannot—nor are they intended to—rival those 
offered by Centro, and the community-organizing and social action agen-
da (and the benefits therein) of the Collaborative fall far outside Centro’s 
bailiwick. In the final analysis, the two organizations functionally comple-
ment each other in this small city where people and problems snug up 
against each other in comfortable and uncomfortable ways. Ironically, 
the key problems that their structures and processes cause boil down to 
those of communication. One then wonders if the remedy to their organi-
zational stumbling blocks might be found, for example, in Centro adopt-
ing more of a team approach to counteract the anomie and alienation 
caused by piling on more administrative strata; and for the Collaborative 
to put in place a system of communicative centralization in place of the 
chaotic and unsystematic means of communication currently in place. 
The trick, I suppose, would lie in the capacity of each to put a brake on 
these solutions lest they, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, become runaway 
remedies engendering a whole new set of problems and dilemmas.
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